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The limits of railway transportation in a mass consumption society
The role of road haulage in a mass consumption society
The diffusion of road haulage also needs to be considered with respect to the special demands made on transportation in the development of a mass consumption society, starting in 1880. A consequence of this is the thesis that a mass consumption society and truck transport are interdependent.
A mass consumption society interconnects the three elements of mass production, bulk sale and mass consumption. The basic approaches of the mass market developed when the railway and the postal services created large economic areas at the end of the nineteenth century. 11 The department stores that emerged at this time, mail-order businesses, and the chains of branch retail stores, which all developed since 1890, covered the whole German Reich, with a distribution network that offered consumer goods for a low price and in large quantities. This was the decisive factor for the mass market. With the mass consumption society a new kind of cargo arose: manufactured goods which could be delivered as packaged goods. These goods were packed in wooden boxes, baskets and cartons and shipped in small amounts. The broad offer of goods in branch-oriented retail sales required complex production and transportation functions. 12 This economic structure caused increased demand for many small, but urgent dispatches to supply stores with goods, including fresh food-as well as canned and processed-a demand which was best met by trucking and which exposed the limits of railway logistics. The handling points for goods traffi c in the railway network were now overburdened and forwarding agencies with their own networks for local and long-distance truck traffi c offered urgently needed alternative capacity for overloaded rail freight yards. They were able to handle transport faster and more cheaply than the railway. After the trucks' breakthrough in the transportation system, new companies and innovative business models emerged, with road carriers, forwarding agencies, and in sales. One example is the forwarding agency Dachser, which was founded in Kempten in 1930 in order to supply the Ruhr area with Bavarian cheese, by truck. 13 In the 1920s, the creation of networks and the establishment of cooperative activities among transportation companies could be observed. Nevertheless, the state tried to regulate the goods traffi c sector in favour of the railway.
The truck carriers were responsive to the new opportunities in the market offered by the truck.
14 Often they only operated a single truck which they bought in instalments from a truck manufacturer. 15 Since truck traffi c had not yet been regulated by law, and liability insurance had not become obligatory, carriers were perceived as gamblers who operated 'wild traffi c'. 16 New measures for designating minimum quality and security standards as well as for the stabilization of the truck-carrying trade were initiated by the chambers of industry and commerce and the associations of forwarders. Owing to the weakness of its members, the truck-carrying trade was unable to respond to economic fl uctuations in the transportation demand and ruinous competition ensued. 17 Around 1930, the demand increased for state regulations throughout Europe as a result of the structure of the truck transportation sector.
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The limits of railways logistics for handling packaged goods
The defi ciencies of railway logistics as service provider in a mass consumption society became evident in the 1920s, and provided an incentive for the development of truck-based logistical systems. Various contributions about the confl ict between the railway and road traffi c in the 1920s can be found in the literature, but they do not thoroughly review the functional problems of railway logistics.
Railway and truck transportation differed in various aspects, for example in their cost structures and ownership, as well as in the legal conditions of their operations. The economic models for railway and motorized transportation also differed to a large extent. The railway was based on a large, hierarchical organization with strict rules, whereas truck transportation was run by small entrepreneurs and was considered wild and anarchistic. Since roads were fi nanced by the state, truck transportation merely had to pay for the wear of the roads but not their fi xed costs. The wear costs were proportional to the length of the distance travelled and were paid together with the fuel tax as variable costs. Therefore, motorized transport had merely to bear the low fi xed costs of the truck or the automobile. In addition, motorized transport was able to operate at any time without being dependent on a schedule. It was able to reach any destination by road even if those roads were in bad condition. The German railway, however, was a state-run business. It had to pay for the high fi xed costs of the railway network, it operated on a fi xed schedule, and it was limited to the track network.
5
The goods traffi c on the Reichsbahn was sorted between packaged goods and wagon loads for bulk cargo, and for combined cargo of less than a wagon load. According to consignment notes, 87 per cent of the dispatches in May 1929 were packaged goods and 13 per cent were wagon loads. 19 Packaged goods are single unit loads that use the capacity of the wagon only partially, for example, a wooden box, cartons or a wooden barrel. While the wagon load used to be handled at cargo quays or was delivered directly to large factories, special freight yards were provided for the traffi c of packaged goods. Those yards had goods sheds where the packaged goods were trans-shipped or stored separately, according to their destination and their receipt and outgoing.
The 1920s saw an increase in packaged goods in various areas, such as the food industry,where canned food was packed and sent in cartons. Another example was in the automobile production and the automobile trade-the important power nodes of a consumption-oriented economic system. Like many automobile components, tyres and rims for automobile wheels were not yet standardized, so if one of the 9,000 automobile repair shops or tyre garages in Germany needed a replacement or spare, it was most likely not in stock. Consequently, this triggered a demand in the spare parts system and initiated the dispatch of packaged goods. Parallel to the rapid distribution of automobiles in the 1920s, whose stock increased from 32,000 in 1920 to 501,000 in 1930 in Germany, 20 there was a considerable increase in packaged goods distribution. Another example for the increase of the exchange packaged goods is the advertisement of the large store chains in the 1920s. These advertisements were planned in a central marketing department and send to the branches in form of hot type frames. 21 Were railway logistics able to adjust to the requirements of mass consumption? The importance of railway logistics can be proved by the fact that between 1900 and 1930, two-thirds of German railway (Reichsbahn) revenue resulted from the transportation of cargo. 22 The structure of goods traffi c in railway logistics of the 1920s was such that in the entire German Reich, the Reichsbahn maintained 11,583 points of dispatch on standard gauge tracks. 23 Among these stopping points for the handling of freight were 9,362 railway stations in cities and villages. The other 2,221 points of dispatch were smaller stops in the countryside, which handled lesser volumes. The 11,583 points of dispatch constitute 134 million traffi c relations from place A to place B (using the formula N*(N−1) with N = 134). According to logistics theory, this network is a 'many-to-many network' which enabled the gigantic spatial dimension of goods traffi c. An analogue statement is valid for passenger transportation. One important characteristic of a manyto-many network is that, on average, the volume of goods transported between two places, A and B, in one week is low. When we consider the 20.4 million tons of packaged goods in 1929 and divide them by the 134 million relations, we get on average 150 kg freight per relation and year, or 3 kg freight per relation and week. These shipments did not fi ll a single 20-ton railroad wagon. Therefore, the structure of the shipments was particularly suitable to small trucks. The exchange of goods was only high between the 49 German cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants in the 1920s.
Initially, railways handled the transportation of most packaged goods. But the increasing shipments in the 1920s began to cause problems for railway logistics. As the manufactured goods industry grew, the Reichbahn's traffi c of packaged goods rose from 14.6 million tons in 1925 to 20.4 million tons in 1929, and railway logistics proved too slow to be able to comply with the requirements for speed. 24 The delivery of packed goods were urgent in many cases, particularly fresh food and spare parts. Furthermore, railway logistics was unable to offer suffi cient terminal capacity and the terminals became congested (Figure 2 ). The Reichsbahn came under pressure from both sides. On the one hand, senders required faster traffi c of packaged goods from the Reichsbahn, which at that time took at least four days between different cities. On the other hand, the truck-which guaranteed quick supply in the surroundings of large cities-put competitive pressure on the Reichbahn's packaged goods traffi c. 25 The limits of railway logistics in the mass consumption society is explained in the following section under six considerations. The fi rst two of them can be understood as strategic considerations: the price system and the marshalling yards as infrastructure. The remaining four considerations relate to the level of logistic processes and describe the slow and complex operations: the local network, the processes at the sheds, the trans-shipment halls and long distance trains.
Pricing
The price system (tariffs) for the transportation of goods by the railway was not geared to the costs of production but to the value of the goods themselves-the price system of a (regional) monopolist, which was geared The limits of railway transportation in a mass consumption society towards maximizing profi t for the customers, and which was common all over the world. For high-value goods (e.g. manufactured goods), a high tariff had to be paid, for low-value goods a lower price. This price system, which did not give the corporate management an incentive to cut costs, was defi ned by the regulatory authority-as in countries with private railways. 26 Since the management of the railway was bound to this price system, it was unable to react to competition in the transportation market, where the truck offered an inexpensive alternative to the railway transport. Truck transport was cheap compared to the railway since it took into account only the actual transportation costs and not the value of the truck load. 27 This price model favoured truck transport, especially in the fast growing segment of manufactured goods in the mass consumption society.
Moreover, the price system of the Reichsbahn was very complex. Hundreds of different prices existed for various categories of goods and different relations between origin and destination. Long queues were common at the counters for handling the orders as clerks had to identify the right price in a time-consuming process. 28 Marshalling yards as infrastructure The rapidly developing demand for infrastructure services led to an increase in capacity, which had previously been achieved only in incremental steps. This thesis can be substantiated in relation to the motorway network and airports. This permanent expansion of capacity can also be observed with regard to marshalling and freight yards. As intersections of the goods traffi c, they were liable to the risk of overcharging. 29, 30 However, the incremental expansion of yards is harder to handle than with motorway networks or airports. Instead of building large formation yards at the places with the largest traffi c volume, capacity was increased by creating additional, small formation yards. This incremental expansion of capacity in the formation yards has been criticized in the literature since it has impeded rational transportation planning. One explanation is that the formation yards built in the nineteenth century were considered technologically outdated, but could not be modernized entirely. Before 1920, the German states railway had not coordinated the network of the formation yards overall, but created independent capacities. 31 Although the infrastructure did not fully meet the requirements for goods traffi c, it nonetheless handled the transportation as far as the capability of the respective switchyards allowed.
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Using the example of Cologne's railway network, this paper shows how fi ve freight yards (Cologne-Kalk, Cologne-Gereon, Cologne-Eifeltor, Cologne-North, Cologne-Mühlheim) were expanded and rebuilt constantly between 1890 and 1930, but were never able to overcome the shortage effectively. 33 A similar race for increased capacity occurred during the construction of the motorway in the 1960s and 1970s, as traffi c volume exceeded available capacity, and the railway reached its limits in serving the cities. Owing to the concentration effect, the Cologne North yard, which accumulated 10,000 freight wagons daily for destinations east of the Rhine River, had to be closed to incoming traffi c at various times, until the accumulated freight wagons had left. 34 The overloading and congestion of the freight yards offered a strong incentive for the forwarder to substitute railway transport with direct truck transport between forwarder and receiver. Consequently, decentralization of truck traffi c also led to decentralized handling in decentralized freight terminals.
Movement in the local network
Whereas small cities had only one railway freight yard, the situation was completely different in big cities, which might have several terminal stations in the city centre. Moreover, there were a large number of freight yards in the suburbs which, as a local freight network, made the surrounding area accessible. This network was complemented by specialized terminals: the post station, the central market station, and the abattoir station ( Figure 3) .
The network of freight yards in the city of Breslau (now Wroclaw in Poland) (Figure 4 ) consisted in 1929 of 24 freight yards, which had sheds The limits of railway transportation in a mass consumption society for the trans-shipment of packaged goods. 35 A central switchyard controlled the movement of the specifi cally organized local goods trains in the network, which comprised wagons both for bulk cargo and for packaged goods. This interconnection of the two transportation types made transportation in the network particularly diffi cult and slow.
From a city logistical point of view, in metropolitan cities like London, Paris or Berlin, the traffi c between the city terminal stations was very complex, because these stations, which were only a few kilometres apart, could only be connected via the orbital railway on the periphery. Accordingly, fairly early on (at the beginning of the 1920s), the exchange of packaged goods between terminal stations in Berlin was taken over by direct truck traffi c. Thus, 222 fi xed routes emerged on which trucks connected the terminal stations and the yards at the orbital railway and the city railway. On average, 200 tons of express freight were trucked every day. Transportation was organized by the national haulage company Marken. 36 The economic advantage of those transports was apparent. The Reichsbahn saved 150 wagons which would otherwise be used for transportation. Road truck traffi c also handled the transport in half the time. Whereas packaged goods on long-distance routes were previously transported via Berlin on railway wagons, after 1922 goods were often offl oaded at Berlin onto trucks. Express goods from Munich to Stettin (now Szczecin in Poland) were loaded onto a truck at the Anhalter Bahnhof railway station and were then transported across Berlin to the Stettiner Bahnhof railway station, where they were then loaded onto the train bound for Stettin.
The processes in the sheds
The organization of delivery services for packaged goods from a railway station was extremely complex. If the receiver did not personally collect the packaged goods (self-collector), or if they did not commission (private) forwarders, the railway agent assumed this task. The handling of incoming packaged goods at large railway stations required considerable organization and led to freight yard congestion and long waiting periods. Selfcollectors and the assigned forwarders had to be informed about the arrival of the goods. Moreover, the forwarders had to show certifi cates of authority. Finally, storage space in the goods shed had to be allocated according to three categories: self-collectors, forwarders and rail forwarders. This complexity required 30 per cent more storage space. In the city of Leipzig the organizing of goods traffi c at the Dresdner Bahnhof involved 75 forwarders with 6,500 certifi cates of authority and 1,200 self-collectors. 37 The incoming packaged goods for delivery had to be checked thoroughly. With such fragmentation in the delivery services in the city area, where the same streets and the same destinations were visited at various times by different forwarders, the concept of integrating traffi c movement made sense. But this was not reviewed again until the city logistical planning of the 1990s.
In Germany the choice of delivery type was primarily determined according to §78 of the Railway Traffi c Regulations. However, the regulation could be limited or totally bypassed by the railway in consultation with the state regulatory authority. 38 In order to decrease the surcharge on the freight yards, the railway stations Elberfeld and Barmen launched a model test for methods to simplify delivery. Self-collection and (private) forwarders were no longer allowed and only railway agents were authorized to deliver goods, resulting in a simplifi cation of the handling. 39 The handling of packaged goods at the goods sheds of the local freight yards required a time-consuming switch of wagons, which had to be positioned precisely at the hatch of the shed for loading and unloading. A shortage in goods traffi c capacity emerged when the traffi c of packaged goods by the Reichsbahn increased. As early as 1911, all goods terminals in Berlin reported a heavy overload during the autumn peak period. 40 The goods shed, whose cargo quay was 200 m long, functioned as an interface between two infrastructures, railway and road, and revealed the limits of railway logistics. While horse-drawn vehicles or motorized trucks were able to turn round or switch arbitrarily on the cargo quay, the wagons were confi ned to the linear dimension of the track. Moreover, horse-drawn vehicles or trucks could switch independently whereas goods wagons had to approach the shed as one train.
The cost structure of the packaged goods service on the Reichsbahn (Table  1) refl ects the time and effort involved in the trans-shipment operations.
Fifty-eight per cent of the total cost was incurred in the sheds and transshipment halls and only 24 per cent in transport itself.
Various statements show that the railway's traffi c of packaged goods was not cost effective: a large proportion of dispatches comprised only of small quanities, travelling short or medium distances and their low transport price did not cover the administrative effort involved in the preparation of letters of consignment and the numerous handling procedures in the goods shed. 41 In 1923, the Reichsbahn founded an academic commission to investigate the use of trucks in local traffi c. 42 By then, a pilot project had been started in Berlin to transfer packaged goods traffi c, of an average 40 tons per day, by road between Görlitzer Bahnhof railway station and Königswusterhausen. 43 Surprisingly, however, the Reichsbahn did not pursue a general policy to give up the uneconomic packaged goods traffi c locally and transfer it onto the truck-either to an own truck-subsidiary or to a foreign company-as the railways in the UK and France had done. 44 The Reichsbahn missed the opportunity to identify a strategic goal for its enterprise by including trucks in the transportation goods, concentrating its mission solely on running trains.
The Reichsbahn searched for ways to accelerate transportation and increase the performance of the sheds. Thus, the board of the Reichsbahn in Cologne separated wagon load traffi c from the traffi c of packaged goods in the Cologne network, and thereby accelerated handling. This model was copied by other Reichsbahn authorities. 45 The authority even attempted to extend capacity with the help of two fl oor sheds or, as in Cologne-Gereon, by placing the wagons upright at the shed. 46 Diffi cult processes in the trans-shipment halls A trans-shipment hall was always located in the network's central switchyard, with six to eight platforms for packaged goods. This hall functioned as a hub with two functions. 47 First, wagons with packaged goods received from local yards were trans-shipped here; second, the packaged goods that came in from the long-distance traffi c were trans-shipped in this hall and distributed to the local yards. At the same time, the hall was the place where the outbound shipments were handled. The handling halls were of The necessary trans-shipping work of packaged goods at the hub were extremely labour-and time-consuming. Trans-shipment problems could arise because of erroneous destination marking, and misallocation of wagons. Damage could occur during the switching operation if wagons collided. 48 Moreover, a schedule had to be calculated which showed when suffi cient packaged goods had been accumulated, ready for shipment. A wagon of packaged goods could not be loaded until at least three tons of packaged goods destined for a particular place ('wagon of place') or a transfer station ('transfer wagon') was in stock. 49 Accordingly, the transportation delay between two infrequented handling points was in the range of weeks. As the platforms in the trans-shipment hall had the layout of a comb and the hall was 400 m long, the trans-shipment of cargo between wagons at different platforms had to cover a great distance on the average. Trans-shipment halls could be vast ( Figure 5 ).
In Germany, the Reichsbahn in 1933 had a network of 65 trans-shipment halls for packaged goods, that was itself a many-to-many network with 65 × 64 = 4,160 traffi c relations. But not all these relations were served by regular direct trains. Of those 4,160 traffi c relations, only 1,583 were carried out on direct service and many packaged goods had to be handled twice in a trans-shipment hall before they could reach their target railway destination. The fi ve locations with the greatest traffi c in packaged good trains in 1933 are shown in Table 2 , highlighting the degree of traffi c in the harbour cities of Hamburg and Bremen. The limits of railway transportation in a mass consumption society Long-distance trains Similar problems to packaged goods traffi c are found with long-distance freight trains which, unlike express trains, did not make intermediate stops. 51 At the formation yards, fully loaded wagons were grouped according to destination. Destinations of more than 100 km were served by long-distance trains consisting of wagons for the specifi c destination, which travelled directly without any intermediate stops. At fi rst glance, this organization of goods traffi c promised rapid transportation of goods to distant destinations. However, this could not be achieved practically since it took days to accumulate suffi cient long-distance wagons for the same destination. The further away the destination, the longer the wait. If the waiting time became too long, the accumulation of wagons was terminated, and a cargo train transported the relevent accumulated wagons together with other wagons to a formation yard closer to the eventual destination. There, the train was dismantled with expensive switching operations and was attached to a new train for the rest of the journey. Partial transport on medium distances substituted for the actual long-distance transport. 52 In this case, the theoretically anticipated rationalization advantage of long-distance transports vanished. Moreover, the duration of wagonload traffi c was much increased. Also, with the long-distance transport of packaged goods, multiple reloading operations were necessary.
Conclusion
This paper shows the limited suitability of railway transport in a 'many-tomany network' which, owing to its multitude of small shipments, can be served more fl exibly and quickly by road trucking. The railway enterprise did not recognize the special requirements of the many-to-many network and continued to operate along the traditional rules of the nineteenth century. With the exploding rise in the exchange of packaged goods in the twentieth century the nodes of the railway logistics became more and more congested. The concentration of traffi c towards the 65 trans-shipment halls was a strategy that could not cope with the demands of customers who expected fast services. Instead of concentration the road trucking fi rms developed decentralized solutions. According to the locations of demand, they established small trans-shipment yards in the city suburbs offering faster services for their customers. This article has explored the role of truck traffi c in a mass consumption society. The various fi elds of railway logistics have been discussed, as well as the role of packaged goods traffi c in a consumption-oriented economic system. The limitations of the railway in handling the transfer of packaged goods, long-distance traffi c and the capacity problems of switchyards gave truck forwarders new opportunities to transfer handling to their own terminals.
Notes

